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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Created pursuant to section 10 of the 1934 Securities Act,1 Rule 
10b-5 is a cornerstone of the federal securities laws. The federal 
courts’ interpretations have largely defined the rule, which seeks to 
remedy a broad range of securities fraud and market manipulation. 
Elements of the rule, such as “scienter” and “reliance,” were defined 
at length by earlier court decisions. However, no court had 
definitively held whether a private plaintiff must demonstrate a causal 
connection between an alleged fraud and the subsequent loss to that 
plaintiff. This issue, referred to as “loss causation,” was decided by the 
Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo.2 The Court, 
reversing a prior Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, held “loss causation” 
must be established in every case brought under Rule 10b-5 by 
pleading and proving a causal connection between the alleged fraud 
and the subsequent loss. This new requirement is commonly believed 
to have changed the landscape of private securities litigation, 
establishing a higher pleading hurdle in all securities-fraud cases. 
Interestingly, as this Commentary demonstrates, the federal securities 
laws contain no foundation for, nor any history of, the requirement of 
“loss causation.” Instead, the element of “loss causation” recently 
added to the pleading requirements of a securities fraud claim is a 
product of tort law, economic analysis, and common sense. 
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 1. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2000). 
 2. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
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II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The plaintiff-class was stockholders in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
(“Dura”) who had purchased Dura stock on the public market. This 
purchase led to the subsequent securities fraud class action against 
Dura.3 Plaintiffs’ theory of the case was that “[i]n reliance on the 
integrity of the market, [the plaintiffs] . . . paid artificially inflated 
prices for Dura securities,” causing the plaintiffs to suffer damages.4 
The class alleged that Dura or its officials made false statements 
concerning profits; falsely claimed that drug sales were expected to be 
profitable; and falsely claimed that the FDA would soon approve its 
asthmatic spray device.5 Plaintiffs further alleged that the company 
subsequently announced that its earnings would be lower than 
expected due to slow drug sales, and the company’s share price 
declined.6 The allegations also chronicle a Dura announcement, eight 
months following the sales announcement, that the FDA would not 
approve Dura’s asthmatic spray device. The day following that 
announcement Dura’s share price fell again, though it almost fully 
recovered a week later.7 
The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the drug-
profitability claim failed to allege an appropriate scienter, and that the 
spray-device claim failed adequately to allege “loss causation.”8 The 
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the complaint adequately alleged 
“loss causation,”9 basing its decision on the theory that “plaintiffs 
establish loss causation if they have shown that the price on the date 
of purchase was inflated because of the misrepresentation.”10 The 
court added that “the injury occurs at the time of the transaction,” 
and because the complaint pleaded “that the price at the time of 
purchase was overstated,” these allegations were sufficient to prove 
“loss causation.”11 
The Supreme Court granted review of the Ninth Circuit decision 
in order to settle a split between the Circuits and their varying 
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versions of “loss causation.”12 The Ninth Circuit, unlike other Courts 
of Appeal, held that the element of “loss causation” is satisfied by the 
allegation that share price at the time of the purchase was inflated.13 
More specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff need not 
allege a subsequent drop in price to meet the injury requirement 
because the injury occurs at the time of the transaction.14 
By contrast, the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff cannot allege 
merely that had he known the true “investment quality” of the stock 
he would not have purchased it. Such allegations are simply assertions 
and do not answer the question of why the money was lost.15 The 
court concluded that, “plaintiffs demonstrate a causal connection 
between the content of the alleged misstatements or omissions and 
‘the harm actually suffered.’”16 
Similarly, the Third Circuit has held that “[w]here the value of the 
security does not actually decline as a result of an alleged 
misrepresentation, it cannot be said that there is in fact an economic 
loss attributable to that misrepresentation.”17 Moreover, the Third 
Circuit’s decision has gone a step further, holding that the plaintiff 
must demonstrate not only a causal connection between 
misrepresentation and decline in price, but also a “correction in the 
market price,” which would cause an inflated price to drop and 
thereby harm the plaintiff.18 Absent such “correction,” a plaintiff can 
sell securities at the inflated price, thus suffering no loss.19 
The Eleventh Circuit took an approach that was a less-than-clear 
case-by-case analysis. A plaintiff need not prove that the misstatement 
by the defendant was the sole cause of loss, but that it was a 
“’substantial,’ i.e., a significant contributing cause.”20 On the other 
hand, the Seventh Circuit, held that “’loss causation’ is just an exotic 
name for a standard requirement of tort law,” equating “loss 
 
 12. Compare Broudo, 339 F.3d at 933, with Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. 
Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 198 (2d Cir. 2003); Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 
165, 185 (3d Cir. 2000); Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447–48 (11th Cir. 1997); 
Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 13. Broudo, 339 F.3d at 938. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 198. 
 16. Id. at 199. 
 17. Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 185. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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causation” to “proximate cause.”21 The Seventh Circuit’s decision 
concerning “loss causation” may have influenced the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Dura. 
III.  HOLDING 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and rejected the 
notion that a plaintiff only has to allege price-inflation due to the 
defendant’s misrepresentation.22 Rather, the Court held that in Rule 
10b-5 cases, inflated price “will not itself constitute or proximately 
cause the relevant economic loss.”23 In doing so, the Court appeared 
to have adopted the Seventh Circuit “no hurt, no tort” proximate 
cause approach to loss causation.24 Moreover, the Court went a step 
further than the Third Circuit, reasoning that, even if sold later at a 
lower price, the decline may not be due to the market correction of 
such misrepresentation, but to other independent factors.25 Such 
factors, the Court explained, could be “changed economic 
circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or 
firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events.”26 The Court concluded 
that, though an inflated purchase price may sometimes result in a 
future loss, the former does not cause the latter as a matter of law.27 
This decision was largely based on the Court’s conclusion that to 
allow recovery based on a simple allegation of misrepresentation 
would be “to provide investors with broad insurance against market 
losses, [instead of protecting] them against those economic losses that 
misrepresentations actually cause.”28 
 
 21. Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 22. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005). 
 23. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78(b); see also 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. Rule 10b-5 prohibits any fraud 
or manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of a security registered on a national 
exchange. 
 24. Compare Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 342–43, with Bastian, 892 F.2d at 685. 
 25. Compare Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 342–43 (“If the purchaser sells later after the 
truth makes its way into the market place, an initially inflated purchase price might mean a later 
loss. But that is far from inevitably so.“), with Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 185 
(3d Cir. 2000) (“In the absence of a correction in the market price, the cost of the alleged 
misrepresentation is still incorporated into the value of the security and may be recovered at 
any time simply by reselling the security at the inflated price.”). 
 26. Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 343. 
 27. Id. at 346. 
 28. Id. at 345. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Court’s decision in Dura, albeit not intentionally, evidences 
the pre-existing tensions between both securities law and tort law and 
between deterrence and fairness. An overriding purpose of the federal 
securities laws in general, and of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(“1934 Act”)29 specifically, is to ensure public confidence in the 
national financial markets by deterring fraud and encouraging 
disclosure, in part, through the availability of private securities fraud 
actions,30 the scope of which is defined by the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (“Reform Act”).31 In an effort to further the 
deterrent goals of the federal securities laws, the Reform Act provides 
for a number of punitive measures. For instance, section 21 of the 
Reform Act provides that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“Commission”) may “in its discretion” investigate any person, and if 
the court determines that the person has violated any section of the 
1934 Act, including section 10(b),32 the court may, pursuant to section 
21, impose a penalty on the violator.33 The amount of penalty is to be 
determined by the court in light of the circumstances, and ranges from 
$5,000 to $100,000 for a natural person and from $50,000 to $500,000 
for a corporate entity.34 Alternatively, the court may impose a penalty 
in the “gross amount of pecuniary gain to such defendant as a result 
of the violation.”35 Thus, as long as the Commission can show that the 
defendant violated section 10,36 the defendant can face a penalty 
regardless of any loss the defendant corporation’s shareholders may 
have suffered. 
Based on the Court’s decision in Dura, however, a plaintiff 
bringing a 10b-5 action cannot recover based only on the violation of 
 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2000). In addition to the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities 
Act of 1933, Section 10 of the 1934 Act provided private purchasers of securities with a remedy 
against fraud. 
 30. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986); Theodore Altman et al., 1-1 Federal 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 1.01 (2005). 
 31. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
 32. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. Rule 10b-5 derives from § 10 of the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
 33. Id. § 78u. 
 34. Id. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(i). 
 35. Id. 
 36. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Section 10(b) prohibits the “use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security, . . . [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe.” 
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Section 10 of the 1934 Act; instead, the plaintiff must prove that its 
loss was proximately caused by the defendant.37 This disparity appears 
to run counter to the fraud-deterrent purpose of the federal securities 
laws, which, considering section 21 of the Reform Act, emphasizes 
liability for violation irrespective of resultant harm.38 
Furthermore, section 21D(b)(1) of the Reform Act, which governs 
private securities fraud actions, likewise provides nothing concerning 
proximate cause.39 Section 21D(b)(1) requires that the complaint 
specify each allegedly misleading statement, the reason why it may be 
misleading, and the surrounding facts of why the statements are 
believed to be false.40 Subsection (b)(2)41 provides that the plaintiff 
must prove that the defendant acted with “a particular state of mind” 
(i.e. “knowingly” or with “scienter”).42 However, the Reform Act is 
silent on the requirements of economic loss or causation.43 Plainly, 
there is nothing in the history of sections 10 of the 1934 Act or 
sections 21 and 21D of the Reform Act that implicates “proximate 
cause.” 
The credit for initially attaching the requirement of proximate 
cause to Rule 10b-5, which, in essence, linked securities law to tort 
law, appears to go to Judge Richard A. Posner.44 Although federal 
courts have applied tort law principles to 10b-5 actions before,45 Judge 
Posner was the first to interpret section 10 and Rule 10b-5 in light of 
 
 37. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(A) (“Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any 
person has violated any provision of this Act . . . the Commission may bring an action in a 
United States district court to seek . . . a civil penalty to be paid by the person who committed 
such violation.”). 
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4. 
 40. Id. § 78u-4(b)(1). 
 41. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Similarly, Hazen’s Law of Securities Regulation, cited by the Court in Dura, does not 
mention “proximate cause” in its definition of “loss causation,” and instead limits the extent of 
required causation to the statutory “in connection with” – a causation standard that has been 
previously interpreted by the courts as “de minimus touch.” THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION, §§ 12.11[1], [3] (2002); see also Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 342; 
Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1028 (6th Cir. 1979) (noting that “the 
alleged deceptive practice only need be ‘touching’ the sale of securities”). 
 44. Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 45. See, e.g., Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983) (applying tort 
principles to find an implied right of action against aiding and abetting a section 10(b) 
violation); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966) 
(applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 to section 10(b) actions). 
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basic notions of tort law and economic efficiency.46 At the heart of 
Judge Posner’s argument for reading proximate cause into Rule 10b-5 
is his proposition that “[n]o social purpose would be served by 
encouraging everyone who suffers an investment loss because of an 
unanticipated change in market conditions to pick through office 
memoranda with a fine-tooth comb in the hope of uncovering a 
misrepresentation.”47 Judge Posner’s arguments, or their subsequent 
rendering, appeared to resonate with the Supreme Court in Dura. In 
the words of Justice Souter: “If you have no damages, you have no 
cause—I mean, on normal tort theory, you have no cause of action.”48 
At first glance, framing a securities fraud action in tort terms 
appears disconnected from the original purpose of the 1934 Act—to 
deter fraud and to encourage disclosure.49 After all, if, after finding a 
mistake in the offering materials and seeing a subsequent share 
decline, a plaintiff brings suit, is the fraud-deterrent goal of the 1934 
not served by a finding of liability irrespective of any connection 
between the mistake and the share decline? It is not. The anti-fraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws are designed to prevent (and 
punish) fraud—not honest mistakes. Furthermore, the concept of a 
“causation-free” securities fraud remedy would ultimately hurt 
investors by unjustly forcing them to absorb the costs of meritless 
securities fraud litigation, undermining the purpose of the 1934 Act 
and all other federal securities laws. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Even after the enactment of the Reform Act, which was designed 
to curb meritless claims, securities fraud actions have continued to be 
so ubiquitous and have such a high potential for abuse that they have 
become a means for investors to hedge against market risks.50 A 
particularly unfortunate by-product of the pre-Dura causational 
uncertainty in securities fraud cases is the so-called “strike suit”—a 
meritless claim that has little chance of success in court, but may 
 
 46. See Bastian, 892 F.2d at 685. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Dura Pharms., Inc., 54 U.S. 336 (No. 03-932). 
 49. 49.Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986); Altman, supra note 30, at § 1.01. 
 50. See William S. Feinstein, Pleading Securities Fraud With Particularity—Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 9(b) in the Rule 10b-5 Context: Kowal v. MCI Communications Corporation, 63 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 851, 852 (1995) (discussing the ubiquity of meritless claims). 
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compel the defendant to settle for an amount far in excess of the 
claim’s verdict value.”51 Strike suits can have a catastrophic effect on a 
company’s financial well-being because of the severe stigma attached 
to the defendant company charged with an anti-fraud violation under 
the 1934 Act.52 Even worse, as the defendant company’s value declines 
in the public market, the taint of securities fraud allegations 
ultimately hurts innocent investors. 
The Court’s decision in Dura did more than impose an exacting 
pleading standard in securities fraud actions—Dura eliminated the 
possibility of senseless harm to innocent companies and investors, 
which creates a better-controlled private anti-fraud litigation regime 
and engenders investor confidence. 
 
 
 51. Id. at 864; see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975) (“[A] 
complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of success at trial has a 
settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect of success at trial so long as 
he may prevent the suit from being resolved against him by dismissal or summary judgment.”); 
Surovwitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966) (discussing the filing of strike suits 
“to coerce corporate managers to settle worthless claims in order to get rid of them”). 
 52. See Feinstein, supra note 50, at 852. 
